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Abstract—Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) are providing
more flexible wireless data services to attract subscribers and
increase revenues. For example, the data trading market enables
user-flexibility by allowing users to sell leftover data to or buy
extra data from each other. The rollover mechanism enables
time-flexibility by allowing a user to utilize his own leftover
data from the previous month in the current month. In this
paper, we investigate the economic viability of offering the data
trading market together with the rollover mechanism, to gain a
deeper understanding of the interrelationship between the user-
flexibility and the time-flexibility. We formulate the interactions
between the MNO and mobile users as a multi-slot dynamic
game. Specifically, in each time slot (e.g., every day), the MNO
first determines the selling and buying prices with the goal
of revenue maximization, then each user decides his trading
action (by solving a dynamic programming problem) to maximize
his long-term payoff. Due to the availability of monthly data
rollover, a user’s daily trading decision corresponds to a dynamic
programming problem with two time scales (i.e., day-to-day and
month-to-month). Our analysis reveals an optimal trading policy
with a target interval structure, specified by a buy-up-to threshold
and a sell-down-to threshold in each time slot. Moreover, we show
that the rollover mechanism makes users sell less and buy more
data given the same trading prices, hence it increases the total
demand while decreasing the total supply in the data trading
market. Finally, numerical results based on real-world data unveil
that the time-flexible rollover mechanism plays a positive role
in the user-flexible data trading market, increasing the MNO’s
revenue by 25% and all users’ payoff by 17% on average.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) typically offer various
wireless data plans. The most widely used data plan is a
three-part tariff defined by a data cap, a monthly one-time
subscription fee, and a linear price for any usage exceeding
the data cap [1]. Due to the stochastic nature of users’ data
demand, the fixed monthly data cap occasionally ends up with
a data leftover (waste) in low-demand months or an overage
usage (additional fee) in high-demand months, both of which
users hope to avoid. To attract more subscribers (and further
increase revenue), many MNOs have been exploring various
innovations on the three-part tariff data plans to offer more
flexibility and reduce users’ data consumption uncertainty over
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Fig. 1: The data trading market with the rollover mechanism.
time. Two successful examples are the rollover mechanism and
the data trading market.
The rollover mechanism offers the time-flexibility by allow-
ing a user’s unused data from the previous month to be used
in the current month. Many MNOs (e.g., AT&T [2], China
Unicom Hong Kong [3], and China Mobile [4]) have adopted
the rollover data plan since 2015. Our previous study in [5]
has shown that the time-flexible rollover mechanism leads to a
win-win situation. That’s, it enables users to hold the leftover
data in low-demand months to compensate the heavy demand
in the future. It also allows the MNO to extract more consumer
surplus through a higher subscription fee. As a result, the
rollover mechanism increases the total social welfare.
Different from the rollover mechanism, the data trading mar-
ket promotes the user-flexibility. In 2014, China Mobile Hong
Kong (CMHK) launched the first data trading market, called
the 2nd exChange Market (2CM) [6]. It allows subscribers
to sell leftover data to or buy extra data from others. The
transaction prices may change over time, depending on the
supply and demand relationship in the data trading market.
In addition, CMHK acts as the middleman and benefits from
the difference between the buying price and selling price. It is
shown in [7] that the trading market is beneficial to the MNO,
since its revenue gain from the trading market is larger than
the revenue loss from overage fee.
Although the two mechanisms are increasingly popular, the
economic viability of the data trading market with a rollover
mechanism has not been clearly demonstrated, which may
impede the MNO’s joint adoption in the telecom market.
First, the rollover mechanism offers users a conservative
way of managing their leftover data, i.e., holding for future
use, while the data trading encourages a more radical attitude
towards data manipulation by taking advantage of the time-
variant trading prices. It is easy to imagine that the rollover
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mechanism will remarkably change users’ data trading behav-
iors, which motivates us to ask the first question:
Question 1. How will users adjust their selling and buying
decisions under the rollover mechanism?
Second, although the joint adoption of the rollover mech-
anism and the data trading market offers more flexibility to
mobile users, it is not yet clear whether the joint adoption is
also beneficial for the MNO, comparing with adopting them
separately. This motivates us to ask the second question:
Question 2. Will rollover mechanism increase or reduce the
MNO’s benefit from data trading market?
In this paper, we will study the economic viability of the
data trading market with a rollover mechanism (as in Fig. 1)
and address the above two key questions. As far as we know,
the interrelationship between the time-flexibility and the user-
flexibility has not been studied before. We hope that this paper
could lead to a much better understanding about them.
B. Key Results and Contributions
Our main results and key contributions are as follows:
• Viability Analysis on the Data Trading Market with
a Rollover Mechanism: We formulate the interactions
between the MNO and users as a multi-slot dynamic
game. In each time slot (e.g., every day), the MNO
first determines the selling price and buying price with
the goal of revenue maximization, then each user de-
termines his trading action to maximize his long-term
payoff. Due to the availability of monthly data rollover, a
user’s optimal trading decision corresponds to a dynamic
programming problem with two time scales (e.g., day-to-
day and month-to-month). Despite the complexity of the
model, we are able to explicitly characterize the optimal
decisions for the MNO and users.
• Optimal Trading Decision: We analyze users’ trading
problem through backward induction and unveil a target
interval trading policy specified by a buy-up-to threshold
and a sell-down-to threshold in each time slot. Such a
target interval policy allows simple implementation for
users in practice and it recovers the optimal trading
decision without the rollover mechanism as a special case.
• Impact of Rollover Mechanism: By comparing the thresh-
olds of the target interval policy, we find that the rollover
mechanism makes users sell less and buy more data under
the same trading prices, which allows users to hold more
data to avoid the potential overage fee and wait for higher
selling prices. Hence the rollover mechanism increases
the total trading market demand and reduces the total
supply.
• Performance Evaluation based on Real-world Data: We
use a group of mobile users’ six-month daily data usage
traces to evaluate the performance improvement brought
by the rollover mechanism. The numerical results show
that offering rollover service can increase the MNO’s
average revenue by 25% and users’ average payoff by
TABLE I: Mobile data pricing literatures.
Reference Application MethodologyRollover Data Trading Multi-period Multi-user
[8]–[10] × × × ×
[11], [12] × × √ ×
[13], [14] × √ × √
[15] × √ √ ×
[16]
√ × × ×
[17]–[20]
√ × × √
This Paper
√ √ √ √
17%, which demonstrate that the rollover mechanism can
be very beneficial to the data trading market.
C. Related Literature
This work focuses on the interrelationship of two data
pricing mechanisms, i.e., the data trading market and the
rollover mechanism. For clarity we list in Table I the related
literature in terms of the mechanism and main methodologies.
There are many excellent works on the traditional mobile
data market without considering the two new mechanisms.
Some focused on the optimization of pricing (e.g., [8], [9]) and
data cap (e.g., [10]) from the MNO’s perspective. Other studies
(e.g., [11], [12]) examined a single user’s data consumption
dynamics using multi-period models.
Data trading market has been studied in [13]–[15]. Zheng
et al. in [13] considered the auction-based trading platform.
Yu et al. in [14] analyzed the users’ behavior with prospect
theory. Andrews et al. in [15] developed a multi-period model
to study a single user’s trading actions. However, these papers
did not take into account the rollover mechanism.
The rollover mechanisms have been studied in [16]–[20].
Zheng et al. in [16] found that moderately price-sensitive users
can benefit from subscribing to the rollover data plan. Wei et
al. in [17] focused on the impact of expiration time. In our
previous works, we studied the consumption priority of the
rollover data [18], the MNOs’ market competition [19], and
the multi-cap design problem [20]. However, none of above
studies considered users’ optimal data trading decisions in the
data trading market.
Our paper differs from the aforementioned works in the
following key aspects: First, our model generalizes the data
trading market and the rollover mechanism into a unified
framework with two-dimensional flexibilities (i.e., user and
time). Second, we explicitly characterize a user’s optimal data
trading policy in each time slot considering the availability
of data rollover. Third, we examine the viability of the data
trading market and the rollover mechanism, which has never
been studied before.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the system model. In Section III, we study users’
trading policy. In Section IV, we analyze the MNO’s pricing
problem. Section V presents the numerical results and Section
VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a telecom market where a set N = {1, 2, .., N}
of mobile users subscribe to a Mobile Network Operator
(MNO). The MNO offers a three-part tariff data plan together
with the rollover and data trading services. The time is slotted
with the index t ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...}. In each slot t (e.g., every day),
the MNO determines the trading prices and each user n ∈ N
takes a trading action (how much to buy or sell). The data
rollover happens at the end of each billing cycle (i.e., every
month), as a result of the user’s data consumption and data
trading decisions in the month.
Next we first introduce the wireless data services in Section
II-A. Then we formulate users’ trading problem and MNO’s
pricing problem in Section II-B and Section II-C, respectively.
A. Wireless Data Services
We introduce the MNO’s wireless data services from the
following four aspects.
1) Mobile Data Plan: We characterize a mobile data plan
by a tuple T = {Q,Π, pi}. The user pays a monthly subscrip-
tion fee Π for the data consumption up to the data cap Q.
For unit data consumption exceeding the data cap, the user
pays the overage fee pi. Such a tuple T includes both the
pure usage-based data plan (i.e., Q = 0 and Π = 0) and the
unlimited data plan (i.e., Q = +∞) as special cases.
In practice, mobile users usually sign a one-year or two-
year contract with the MNO for a particular data plan. We
consider a time horizon consisting of M months and suppose
that there are a total of K time slots in each month (e.g., 30
days). Denote m ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} as the m-th month and k ∈
{1, 2, ...,K} as the k-th time slot in a particular month. Hence
the time slot (m, k) corresponds to t = K(m − 1) + k. For
the sake of presentation, we use (m, k) and t interchangeably.
2) Rollover Mechanism: The rollover mechanism allows a
user’s leftover data from the previous month to be used in the
current month. Different rollover mechanisms can be classified
based on the consumption priority between the rollover data
and the current monthly data cap, the impact of which has been
extensively studied in [18]. In this work, we focus on one
of the most common implementations by MNOs (including
China Mobile and China Unicom HK): the rollover data from
the previous month is consumed prior to the current monthly
data cap and expires at the end of the current month.
3) Data Trading Market: Mobile users can sell their left-
over data or buy extra data in the data trading market. The
MNO determines the selling price pst and the buying price
pbt based on the total trading market supply (from sellers)
and the total trading market demand (from buyers) in each
time slot t. In this work, we consider the MNO’s revenue-
maximizing pricing strategy, i.e., the MNO decides the trading
prices pt = {pst , pbt} to maximize its revenue in slot t. Our
later analysis in Section IV shows that the revenue-maximizing
pricing clears the data trading market, i.e., the trading market
demand equals to the trading market supply. Other objectives
(e.g., maximizing the long-term revenue) are also possible but
may not clear the market efficiently, which will be discussed
in Section VI.
4) Implementation of Data Rollover & Trading: There will
be some new considerations for the MNO when offering both
Remaining Monthly Cap(d) Buy data  :
(c) Sell data  :
Rollover data Monthly Cap
Monthly Cap
Consumed
Consumed
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Fig. 2: The MNO’s policy on rollover and data trading.
rollover and trading services. Under the rollover mechanism,
users have two types of data caps that differ in terms of the
expiration time, which we call the short-term data cap and the
long-term data cap.
• The shot-term data cap can be consumed in the current
month, and expires at the end of the current month.
• The long-term data cap not only can be consumed in the
current month, but also can rollover to the next month.
Data trading behavior affects the short-term and long-term
data caps. When a user buys some extra data from other users,
most MNOs (e.g., AT&T and China Mobile) require that the
purchased data cannot rollover (i.e., it is short-term) and is
consumed with the top priority. When a user wants to sell
some extra data to other users, we assume that the short-term
data is sold prior to the long-terms data, which will lead to
the maximum flexibility to the user.
To sum up, the short-term data includes two parts: the
rollover data from the previous month and the purchased data
from the trading market in the current month. The long-term
data only corresponds to the current monthly data cap Q.
Moreover, the short-term data is consumed and sold prior to
the long-term one. Fig. 2 provides an illustration of the MNO’s
policy of data rollover and trading.
B. Mobile Users’ Decisions
We introduce how to model users’ decisions in five aspects.
1) Data Volume: We use {Qn,Πn, pi} to represent the data
plan of user n. Note that the per-unit fee pi is usually the same
among various data plans from the same MNO [1]. In time
slot t, we denote ent and q
n
t as the short-term data volume
and the long-term data volume, respectively. Since Qn is the
potential maximal long-term data, qnt ≤ Qn. We further denote
et = {ent , n ∈ N} and qt = {qnt , n ∈ N} as all users’ short-
term data vector and long-term data vector, respectively.
The sequence of events in each time slot t is as follows
(also see Fig. 3):
• MNO Pricing: The MNO decides the prices pt =
{pst , pbt}.
• Users Review: Each user n ∈ N reviews his leftover data
volume (ent , q
n
t ) and the trading prices pt = {pst , pbt}.
• Users Trade: Each user n takes a trading action (i.e.,
buy, sell, or no trading) and his leftover data becomes
(e¯nt , q¯
n
t ).
• Users Consume: After user n consumes data, his leftover
data volume decreases to (eˆnt , qˆ
n
t ) at the end of slot t.
MNO decides trading
prices ௧ ௧௦ ௧௕
MNO pricing Users consumeUsers review Users trade
User reviews trading prices ௧
and his leftover data ௧௡ ௧௡
User buys or sells data and the 
leftover data becomes ௧௡ ௧௡
User consumes data and the 
leftover data becomes ௧௡ ௧௡
Time slot 
Fig. 3: The sequence of events in each time slot t.
Next we explain users’ trading actions and data consump-
tions. We adopt the notations of (·)+ = max{·, 0} and
(·)− = min{·, 0} for brevity.
2) Trading Action: We denote ant as the data trading action
of user n in time slot t. It covers the following three cases.
• Buy data (ant > 0): User n buys a
n
t amount of data with
a unit-price pbt . His short-term data volume increases, i.e.,
e¯nt = e
n
t + a
n
t , while the long-term data volume does not
change, i.e., q¯nt = q
n
t .
• Sell data (ant < 0): User n sells |ant | amount of data
with a unit-price pst . His short-term data is sold first, i.e.,
e¯nt = (e
n
t + a
n
t )
+. If that is not enough to, then he will
sell the long-term data, i.e., q¯nt = q
n
t + (e
n
t + a
n
t )
−.
• No trading (ant = 0): User n does not sell or buy data.
His data volume remains the same, i.e., e¯nt = et and
q¯nt = q
n
t .
To sum it up, user n’s leftover short-term and long-term
data volumes after data trading can be represented as:{
e¯nt = (e
n
t + a
n
t )
+,
q¯nt = q
n
t + (e
n
t + a
n
t )
−,
(1)
where ant ≥ −(ent +qnt ), since user n can sell at most ent +qnt
units of data. For notation simplicity, we denote z¯nt as the total
data volume of user n after his trading action ant , given by
z¯nt = e¯
n
t + q¯
n
t = e
n
t + q
n
t + a
n
t . (2)
3) Data Consumption: As each user n’s data consumption
in time slot t is stochastically random (i.e., not known by the
user beforehand), we model it as a random variable xnt with a
PDF fn(·). The distribution information is available from the
historical data consumption record. In Section V, we will use
real-world data to estimate the distribution fn(·) for each user.
According to the MNO’s policy in Section II-A4, user n
consumes his short-term data first, i.e., eˆnt = (e¯
n
t − xnt )+. If
the short-term data is not enough, then he further consumes
the long-term data. After the long-term data decreases to zero,
further data consumption will lead to an overage charge with a
unit price pi. Therefore, the leftover short-term and long-term
data volumes after data consumption are{
eˆnt = (e¯
n
t − xnt )+,
qˆnt =
(
q¯nt + (e¯
n
t − xnt )−
)+
.
(3)
4) One-slot User Payoff: A user’s one-slot payoff depends
on the one-slot utility from consuming data, overage charge,
and the trading income or cost. First, we use a general
utility function un(x) to represent user n’s one-slot utility of
consuming x units data. Function un(x) is assumed to be an
increasing and concave function in x. Second, user n has to
pay the overage charge pi(xnt − ent − qnt − ant )+ if his data
demand exceeds the leftover total data volume after trading.
Third, the data trading decision ant brings a monetary income
pst · (−ant )+ or a monetary cost pbt · (ant )+. Therefore, the
one-slot payoff of user n is
vnt (e
n
t , q
n
t ,pt, a
n
t , x
n
t ) =un(x
n
t )− pi (xnt − ent − qnt − ant )+
+ pst · (−ant )+ − pbt · (ant )+.
(4)
We take the expectation over the random data consumption
xnt to derive user n’s one-slot expected payoff :
v¯nt (e
n
t , q
n
t ,pt, a
n
t ) =
∫ +∞
0
vnt (e
n
t , q
n
t ,pt, a
n
t , x) fn(x)dx.
(5)
To illustrate the key insights of the optimal trading policy
(in Section III), we treat z¯nt (defined in (2)) as the trading
decision variable of user n, instead of using ant . Hence we
rewrite the user’s one-slot expected payoff as follows:
v¯nt (e
n
t , q
n
t ,pt, z¯
n
t ) = W (z¯
n
t ) + J(e
n
t + q
n
t − z¯nt ,pt), (6)
where Wn(z¯) and J(z,pt) are given by
W (z¯) ,
∫ +∞
0
[
un(x)− pi (x− z¯)+
]
fn(x)dx, (7)
J(z,pt) , pst · (z)+ − pbt · (−z)+. (8)
5) Multi-slot Data Trading & Rollover: Based on user n’s
one-slot expected payoff in (6), we will further formulate a
user’s multi-slot data trading problem. Before that, we first
introduce the transition between consecutive time slots, which
contains the following two cases:
• If the current time slot t is not the end of a month, then
the user’s data volume at the beginning of the next time
slot equals to that at the end of the current time slot, i.e.,{
ent+1 = eˆ
n
t ,
qnt+1 = qˆ
n
t .
(9)
• If the current time slot t is the end of a month, then the
eˆnt units of short-term data expires, while the qˆ
n
t units of
long-term data will rollover and becomes the short-term
data of the next month. Moreover, the monthly data cap
Qn becomes available to user n again. Therefore, the data
volume in the next time slot is{
ent+1 = qˆ
n
t ,
qnt+1 = Q
n.
(10)
We denote V nt (e
n
t , q
n
t ,pt) as user n’s maximal expected
total discounted payoff from slot t to his contract end, given
his current data volume (ent , q
n
t ) and the trading prices pt. We
also refer to V nt (e
n
t , q
n
t ,pt) as user n’s value function in time
slot t. Accordingly, we can formulate user n’s multi-slot data
trading as the following dynamic programming problem.
Problem 1 (User n’s Multi-Slot Data Trading Problem). For
user n in the k-th time slot of the m-th month, i.e., t = K(m−
1) + k, his value function has three cases:
1. If m = M and k = K, the value function is
V nt (e
n
t , q
n
t ,pt) = max
z¯nt ≥0
{
J(ent + q
n
t − z¯nt ,pt) +W (z¯nt )
}
.
(11)
2. If m < M and k = K, the value function is
V nt (e
n
t , q
n
t ,pt) = max
z¯n≥0
{
J(ent + q
n
t − z¯nt ,pt) +W (z¯nt )
+ δ · Et
[
V nt+1 (qˆ
n
t , Q
n,pt+1)
] }
.
(12)
3. If k < K, the value function is
V nt (e
n
t , q
n
t ,pt) = max
z¯nt ≥0
{
J(ent + q
n
t − z¯nt ,pt) +W (z¯nt )
+ δ · Et
[
V nt+1 (eˆ
n
t , qˆ
n
t ,pt+1)
] }
.
(13)
Case 1 corresponds to the very last time slot (contract
ending day). On the RHS, the terms inside the brackets is
the one-slot expected payoff.
Case 2 corresponds to the last time slot of each
month (excluding the contract-ending month). The term δ ·
Et
[
V nt+1 (qˆ
n
t , Q
n,pt+1)
]
is the expected maximal discounted
payoff from slot t+1 to the end of the contract. Here δ ∈ (0, 1)
is the time discount. We use Et[·] to denote Exn
[
Ept+1 [·]
]
for
brevity.1 Moreover, we have substituted (10) in (12) here.
Case 3 corresponds to the time slots that are not the last
slot of any month. We have substituted (9) in the third term
of the RHS of (13), i.e., δ · Et
[
V nt+1 (eˆ
n
t , qˆ
n
t ,pt+1)
]
.
In each time slot t, user n needs to make his optimal data
trading decision z¯n∗t based on the trading prices pt and his
leftover data volume (ent , q
n
t ), while taking into account his
random data demand xnt . We will derive the users’ optimal
trading policy in Section III.
C. MNO’s Decision
We formulate MNO’s pricing problem based on the above
users’ model. Recall that user n makes his trading decision ant
based on his leftover data and the trading prices pt = {pst , pbt}.
The user might become a seller (i.e., ant < 0) or a buyer (i.e.,
ant > 0), or choose not trade at all (i.e., a
n
t = 0). Therefore,
the total trading market demand (from all buyers) is
Dt(pt) =
∑
n∈N
(ant )
+
, (14)
and the total trading market supply (from all sellers) is
St(pt) =
∑
n∈N
(−ant )+ . (15)
1In practice, users only have prior beliefs of the future trading prices instead
of knowing their precise values in advance. The prior beliefs come from the
observation of the past trading prices, with related discussions in [21].
In (14) and (15), all users’ trading decision vector at =
{ant , n ∈ N} depends on the prices pt. We will derive the
corresponding more detailed expression in Section IV after
analyzing users’ optimal data trading policy in Section III.
Given the total demand Dt(pt) and the total supply
St(pt), the total transaction quantity in the market becomes
min{Dt(pt), St(pt)}. The MNO obtains pbt−pst revenue from
each unit of transaction data. Therefore, we formulate the
MNO’s revenue-maximizing pricing problem as follows:
Problem 2 (MNO’s Pricing Problem).
max
pt≥0
(
pbt − pst
) ·min{St(pt), Dt(pt)}. (16)
Now we have introduced the full model. Next we first study
users’ optimal data trading policy in Section III, and then look
at MNO’s revenue-maximizing pricing in Section IV.
III. USERS’ TRADING POLICY
Next we will study the user’s optimal data trading policy
under two different scenarios:
• Plain trading: A user decides his trading action to maxi-
mize the total discounted payoff in the current month, if
no rollover happens at the end of the current month.
• Rollover-involved trading: A user decides his trading
action to maximize the total discounted payoff in the
future, if rollover happens at the end of the current month.
Users will be in the plain trading case if the MNO does not
offer the rollover mechanism. If the MNO offers, users will
face the plain trading case in the last month of the contract
period and the rollover-involved trading case in other months.
Next we study the trading policy under the two scenarios
and then compare the key differences between them. Since our
analysis focuses on a generic user’s optimal decision, we will
suppress the superscript n unless it is not clear. Due to space
limit, proofs are provided in the on-line technical report [22].
A. Plain Trading
Now we study the plain trading case. Specifically, we will
analyze the optimal trading policy of each time slots in the
contract-ending (M -th) month, i.e., t = K(M − 1) + k and
k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}. Theorem 1 summarizes the result. Due to
page limit, we provide proof sketches for Theorems 1 and 2,
and omit the proofs of other results.
Theorem 1 (Plain Trading Policy). For any t = K(M −
1) + k and k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, given the leftover data volume
(e, q) and the trading prices p = {ps, pb}, there exists a
pair of thresholds {LPlaink,M (pb), UPlaink,M (ps)} with LPlaink,M (pb) ≤
UPlaink,M (p
s), such that the optimal trading action is
z¯∗t =

LPlaink,M (p
b), if e+ q < LPlaink,M (p
b),
e+ q, if LPlaink,M (p
b) ≤ e+ q ≤ UPlaink,M (ps),
UPlaink,M (p
s), if e+ q > UPlaink,M (p
s).
(17)
Theorem 1 shows that the optimal plain trading policy is
a target interval policy specified by the buy-up-to threshold
LPlaink,M (p
b) and the sell-down-to threshold UPlaink,M (p
s). More
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Fig. 4: Illustrations of the optimal trading policy given the trading price p = {ps, pb}.
specifically, if the user’s total leftover data volume e + q is
less than LPlaink,M (p
b), then the user needs to buy extra data and
increase the leftover data volume to LPlaink,M (p
b). If the leftover
data e+q is higher than UPlaink,M (p
s), then he needs to sell some
data and reduce the leftover data volume to UPlaink,M (p
s). If the
leftover data e + q is already between these two thresholds,
the user should choose not to trade.
Fig. 4(a) illustrates the optimal plain trading policy in the
k-th time slot of the M -th month. The horizontal and vertical
axises correspond to the user’s long-term data q and the shot-
term data e. Each point in the plane specifies the data volume
(e, q). The blue region between the selling line and the buying
line represents those states where the user do not need to trade,
i.e., LPlaink,M (p
b) ≤ e+q ≤ UPlaink,M (ps). The blue squares represent
the data volume before trading, i.e., (et, qt). The red circles
represent the data volume after trading, i.e., (e¯t, q¯t). We also
represent the optimal trading action with the blue arrows.
Next we present the key properties of the threshold values
in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. The two thresholds {LPlaink,M (pb), UPlaink,M (ps)} in
Theorem 1 have the following properties.
1) The buy-up-to threshold LPlaink,M (p
b) decreases in pb.
2) The sell-down-to threshold UPlaink,M (p
s) decreases in ps.
3) Given the trading price p, we have{
LPlain1,M (p
b) ≥ LPlain2,M (pb) ≥ ... ≥ LPlainK,M (pb),
UPlain1,M (p
s) ≥ UPlain2,M (ps) ≥ ... ≥ UPlainK,M (ps).
(18)
In Corollary 1, the first property indicates that a higher
buying price pb leads to a lower buy-up-to threshold LPlaink,M (p
b),
hence the user tends to buy less data. The second property
indicates that a higher selling price ps leads to a lower sell-
down-to threshold UPlaink,M (p
s), hence the user will sell more
data. The third property shows that the thresholds decrease in
time. This is because that the need to maintain a high data
inventory decreases over time.
B. Rollover-involved Trading
Now we study the rollover-involved trading and analyze
the optimal trading policy in each time slot before the last
month, i.e., t = K(m − 1) + k where k ≤ K and m < M .
We first present the optimal rollover-involved trading policy
in Theorem 2 and then elaborate it in details.
Theorem 2 (Rollover-involved Trading Policy). For all t =
K(m − 1) + k and m < M , given the data volume (e, q)
and the trading prices p = {ps, pb}, there exists a pair
of thresholds {LRollk,m(pb, q), URollk,m(ps, q)} with LRollk,m(pb, q) ≤
URollk,m(p
s, q), such that the optimal trading action is
z¯∗t =

LRollk,m(p
b, q), if e+ q < LRollk,m(p
b, q),
e+ q, if LRollk,m(p
b, q) ≤ e+ q ≤ URollk,m(ps, q),
URollk,m(p
s, q), if e+ q > URollk,m(p
s, q).
(19)
Theorem 2 shows that the optimal rollover-involved trading
policy is still a target interval policy, which is similar to that
in the plain trading case. However, the buy-up-to threshold
LRollk,m(p
b, q) and the sell-down-to threshold URollk,m(p
b, q) not
only depends on the trading price p, but also the leftover long-
term data volume q. This is because that the long-term data q
also plays a role in the next month. Before we illustrate the
rollover-involved trading policy, let us first introduce some key
properties in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. For all t = K(m − 1) + k and m < M , the
thresholds {LRollk,m(pb, q), URollk,m(ps, q)} in Theorem 2 have the
following properties:
1) The buy-up-to threshold LRollk,m(p
b, q) decreases in pb.
2) The sell-down-to threshold URollk,m(p
s, q) decreases in ps.
3) Given the trading prices p, we have{
LRoll1,m(p
b, q) ≥ LRoll2,m(pb, q) ≥ ... ≥ LRollK,m(pb, q),
URoll1,m(p
s, q) ≥ URoll2,m(ps, q) ≥ ... ≥ URollK,m(ps, q).
(20)
4) If q = 0, then we have{
LRollk,m(p
b, 0) = LPlaink,M (p
b),
URollk,m(p
s, 0) = UPlaink,M (p
s).
(21)
The first three properties of Corollary 2 indicate similar
intuitions as those in Corollary 1. The fourth property of
Corollary 2 further shows that the two thresholds of the
rollover-involved case degenerate into those of plain trading if
there is no long-term data, i.e., q = 0. That is, the plain trading
policy is a special case of the rollover-involved trading policy.
Fig. 4(b) illustrates the rollover-involved trading policy in
the k-th time slot of the m-th month, where m < M . Here
the blue region between the selling curve and the buying
curve represents those states where the user does not need to
trade, i.e., LRollk,m(p
b, q) ≤ e+ q ≤ URollk,m(ps, q). By comparing
Fig. 4(b) with Fig. 4(a), we note that the rollover mechanism
changes the straight selling and buying lines (as in Fig. 4(a))
into nonlinear curves (as in Fig. 4(b)). In the following, we
discuss more insights on the trading thresholds and examine
the impact of rollover mechanism.
C. Impact of Rollover Mechanism
Based on the analysis of the optimal trading policy of the
two cases, we investigate the impact of rollover mechanism
on users’ trading behaviors in Corollary 3.
Corollary 3. Considering the same k-th time slot of different
months, given the trading prices p = {ps, pb}, the correspond-
ing thresholds satisfy{
LRollk,1 (p
b, q) ≥ LRollk,2 (pb, q) ≥ ... ≥ LPlaink,M (pb),
URollk,1 (p
s, q) ≥ URollk,2 (ps, q) ≥ ... ≥ UPlaink,M (ps).
(22)
We illustrate Corollary 3 by combining Fig. 4(a) and Fig.
4(b) together in Fig. 4(c). We note that there are two regions
(i.e., Regions I and II) indicating different trading actions:
• Region I: The optimal policy is buying data based on the
dash curves (with rollover) , but no-trading based on the
solid lines (plain trading). That’s, the rollover mechanism
makes users buy more data.
• Region II: The optimal policy is no-trading based on the
dash curves (with rollover), but selling data based on the
solid lines (plain trading). That’s, the rollover mechanism
makes users sell less data.
To sum up, we find that the rollover mechanism makes
users hold more data by shifting the buying curve and selling
curve upwards. A high data inventory not only helps reduce
the potential overage charge, but also increases the potential
selling income (as the user can wait for higher selling prices).
IV. MNO’S PRICING
We study the MNO’s revenue-maximizing pricing problem,
considering users’ optimal data trading policy derived in The-
orems 1 and 2. In this section, we will recover the superscript
n for each user.
Given all users’ leftover data volume et and qt in time slot
t, under the trading prices pt = {pst , pbt}, the total trading
market demand (from buyers) is given by
Dt(p
b
t) =
∑
n∈N
(
Lnt (p
b
t , q
n
t )− ent − qnt
)+
, (23)
where Lnt (p
b
t , q
n
t ) is the buy-up-to threshold of user n in time
slot t.
Similarly, the total trading market supply (from sellers) is
St(p
s
t ) =
∑
n∈N
(
ent + q
n
t − Unt (pst , qnt )
)+
, (24)
where Unt (p
s
t , q
n
t ) is the sell-down-to threshold of user n in
time slot t.
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Fig. 5: An illustration of the market clear pricing.
Fig. 5 illustrates the different scenarios of demand and
supply. In each sub-figure, the vertical and horizontal axises
correspond to the price (labeled by p) and the quantity,
respectively. The two curves are the demand curve Dt(p) and
the supply curve St(p).
• Fig. 5(a): If the total demand is larger than the total
supply, i.e., St(pst ) < Dt(p
b
t), then the area of gray region
is the MNO’s total revenue, i.e., (pbt − pst ) · St(pst ). It is
obvious that the MNO can increase its revenue by raising
the buying price from pbt to pˆ
b
t . Accordingly, the area of
green region is the MNO’s revenue increment.
• Fig. 5(b): If the total demand is smaller than the total
supply, i.e., St(pst ) > Dt(p
b
t), then it is obvious that the
MNO can increases its revenue by decreasing the selling
price from pst to pˆ
s
t . Similarly, the area of green region
is the revenue increment for the MNO.
Based on the above insights, we can conclude that the MNO
should set the price such that the demand equals to the supply
in the data trading market. Next we characterize the MNO’s
optimal prices in Theorem 3. For notation simplicity, we first
define Pt,D(θ) and Pt,S(θ) as the inverse functions of Dt(p)
and St(p), respectively. Here θ is the quantity of total market
demand or supply.
Theorem 3. In time slot t, the MNO’s revenue-maximizing
prices, denoted by {p˜st , p˜bt}, are given by{
p˜st = Pt,S(θ
∗),
p˜bt = Pt,D(θ
∗),
(25)
where θ∗ is the optimal transaction quantity, given by
Pt,D(θ
∗) + θ∗ · P ′t,D(θ∗) = Pt,S(θ∗) + θ∗ · P ′t,S(θ∗). (26)
In Theorem 3, we characterize the optimal selling price p˜st
and buying price p˜bt through the optimal transaction quantity
θ∗ based on the demand and supply curves. In practice, the
MNO can estimate the demand and supply curve based on all
users’ leftover data volumes et and qt. In Section V, we will
further quantitatively evaluate the MNO’s revenue based on
the real-world data.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We apply our analysis to a real-world usage trace. We
collect a group of mobile users’ data consumption records in
China from December 2017 to June 2018. For each user in our
(a) User 1: µ = 15.2, σ = 11.5 (b) User 2: µ = 70.2, σ = 46.1
Fig. 6: Fitting results based on two users’ empirical data.
dataset, we have the information of the data consumption and
the corresponding time duration for each Internet connection.2
We first use the empirical data to estimate users’ demand
distributions, then compare the buy-up-to and sell-down-to
thresholds based on the data. Finally, we evaluate the impact
of rollover mechanism on MNO revenue and user payoffs.
A. Empirical Results
Mobile users’ data consumption highly depends on their
daily activity and mobility. Many statistical studies (e.g., [23])
have shown a clear periodic nature for Internet connections
and the period is twenty-four hours. Therefore, we follow the
previous studies in [12] by viewing one day as the minimum
time slot and estimate users’ daily demand distribution by
assuming a normal distribution N(µ, σ2) truncated at zero.
The mean µ and the standard deviation σ are the two parame-
ters that we need to estimate for each individual. To proceed,
we first estimate the two parameters to minimize the least
squares divergence between the estimated and empirical PDFs,
then verify the goodness-of-fit statistically using Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test.
Due to the space limit, here we take two users as examples.
In Fig. 6, we plot the fitting results of the low-demand User
1 (with a 0.5GB data cap) and the high-demand User 2 (with
a 2GB data cap). Here the green bars and the black curves
are the empirical PDFs and estimated PDFs, respectively. The
mean µ and standard derivation σ are labeled in the captions.
B. Optimal Trading Policy
Next we simulate the trading thresholds for each user
based on the estimated data consumption distribution. To
make reasonable comparison, here we fix the trading prices
as ps = 10HKD/GB and pb = 15HKD/GB. We will examine
the time-variant prices in Section V-C.
1) Plain Trading: Fig. 7 shows the trading thresholds of
User 1 and User 2 in the plain trading case. In each sub-
figure, the horizontal axis represents the k-th day of the month.
For the illustration purpose, we only show the results of the
second half month, i.e., k = 16, 17, ..., 30. Moreover, we
2Mobile users in China can download their data consumption trace of the
previous six months. We collect the data from the volunteered mobile users.
We refer interested readers to our technical report for more details [22].
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Fig. 7: Plain trading thresholds of User 1 and User 2 under
different time discounts δ ∈ {0.92, 0.95, 0.98}.
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Fig. 8: Rollover-involved trading thresholds with δ = 0.98.
investigate the impact of time preference by considering three
time discount values, i.e., δ ∈ {0.92, 0.95, 0.98}.
Overall, both of the buy-up-to threshold and sell-down-
to threshold decrease in k. However, the value of buy-up-to
threshold LPlaink,M is less sensitive to k and always remain small.
This is because that users do not need to buy a lot of extra
data in advance. Instead, they prefer to maintaining a small
amount of leftover data to avoid overage fee in the current day,
then only buy more data when the data consumption reaches
a significant level in the current month.
We observe from Fig. 7 that a larger time discount leads to
the increase of both threshold values. That is, the user tends to
sell less and buy more data as δ increases. This is because that
a larger discount δ corresponds to a better joint consideration
for the current and the future, which is twofold:
• The user is willing to be more patient to sell data for
immediate income.
• The user is less sensitive to incur immediate cost from
buying data.
2) Rollover-involved Trading: Now we look at the rollover-
involved trading scenario. Recall that the buy-up-to threshold
LRollk,m and the sell-down-to threshold U
Roll
k,m are related to the
long-term data volume q. Fig. 8 shows how the long-term data
volume q affects the two thresholds with δ = 0.98. Similarly,
the horizontal axis represents the k-th day in a month. The
two black circle curves represent the two thresholds with zero
long-term data, i.e., LRollk,m(p
b, 0) and URollk,m(p
s, 0). The two
red square curves are the thresholds with the maximal long-
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Fig. 9: Performance evaluation.
term data, i.e., LRollk,m(p
s, Q) and URollk,m(p
b, Q). Therefore, the
buy-up-to threshold LRollk,m(p
b, q) will appear in the red region
and sell-down-to threshold URollk,m(p
b, q) will appear in the blue
region. On average, the long-term data volume q leads to 20%
and 10% increase of the buy-up-to and sell-down-to threshold
values, respectively.
C. Performance Evaluation
To quantitatively evaluate the effect of rollover mechanism,
we consider Q = 1GB data cap with Π = 100HKD monthly
subscription fee. The per-unit fee is pi = 30HKD/GB. Based
on the estimated daily data consumption distribution, we
randomly generate six-month daily data usage for 500 mobile
users. We consider two cases with and without the rollover
mechanism. For each case, we first determine whether the user
will subscribe to this data plan based on his value function,
then we simulate the MNO’s pricing, users’ trading and data
consumption process for six months.
Fig. 9(a) plots the average daily trading prices in a month.
The two red curves (marked by triangles) represent the trading
prices without rollover mechanism, while the two blue curves
(marked by circles) represent the case with rollover mech-
anism. We note that the rollover mechanism drives both the
buying and selling prices higher. This is because that the time-
flexibility enables users to buy more but sell less data, leading
to a seller’s market with higher trading prices. Fig. 9(b) and
Fig. 9(c) plot users’ average monthly payoff and the MNO’s
average monthly revenue, respectively. We observe from the
black curves (marked by stars) that the rollover mechanism
can increase users’ monthly payoff by 17% on average and the
MNO’s monthly revenue by 25% on average, compared with
the case without rollover mechanism. These improvements are
quite substantial.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the economic viability of the data
trading market with the rollover mechanism and investigated
the interrelationship between the time-flexibility and user-
flexibility. We found that the time-flexible rollover mechanism
benefits the user-flexible data trading market, in the sense that
it can substantially increases both users’ expected payoff and
the MNO’s expected revenue.
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